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AcADEMIC discourse in the People's Republic of China is 
strikingly political by comparison with Western standards. 
Chinese readily read historical accounts as political metaphors, 
the historiography of many fields tends to follow changes in 
the political line, and analyses of seemingly distant and trivial 
events have occasionally set intellectual heads rolling. The 
political weight of history in China relates in part to a 
willingness to take history seriously as a teacher for the present 
and in part to a strong recognition that intellectuals are 
influential actors whose statements have social and political 
roots and consequences. Yet this day-to-day recognition of the 
dialectical relationship between historian and society exists 
alongside an explicit theory of the primacy of a material base 
over a superstructure. This theory dominates direct discus-
sions of the role of ideas, and the result is a kind of 
contradictory consciousness about the historical relation of 
ideas to society that pervades a great deal of Chinese historical 
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research. Like any discourse, 1 Chinese writing about ideas and 
society can be deconstructed to show internal contradictions 
rooted in the social organization of scholarship. 
The historiography of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom 
accounts for only a small part of this Chinese discourse, but the 
political and historical importance of the rebellion makes it a 
good example of processes that characterize a great deal of 
social research in China. Using just a few aspects of the 
voluminous Taiping literature as example, this article will 
address the political grounding of Chinese social research and 
the contradictory way in which that research addresses the 
relation of consciousness to social relations. Finally, it will 
suggest some of the ways that the social experience of Chinese 
scholars themselves helps to support the particular structure of 
their discourse. 
Historical Discourse 
The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was a huge, avowedly 
Christian rebellion of the nineteenth century. The Taiping 
rebellion has been important in modern politics ever since Sun 
Yat-sen marked it as a crucial precursor to his own nationalist, 
anti-Manchu (and thus anti-Qing dynasty) ideology. The 
frequent appearance of major statements by important 
Taiping scholars in newspapers like the People 's Daily provides 
one clear sign of its continuing political importance. Such 
publication implies government ratification of particular 
theories or certain lines of research, and has provided a major 
forum for topics like the peasant nature of the rebellion, the 
role of certain leaders (especially Li Xiucheng, to be discussed 
below), and more recently the role of religion. The m£tior 
historical questions have also moved with the political times. 
1 See, for example, Michael Ryan, Marxism and Deconstruction: A Critical Articulation 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 11-22. 
HISTORIANS AND CONSCIOUSNESS 733 
Just after the 1949 revolution there was a strong attempt to 
show that the rebellion (like the Communist revolution) was 
based in the peasantry. Luo Ergang, one of the leading 
Taiping historians, for example, argued in his early work that 
the Taiping was nationalist and democratic (more or less the 
Nationalist, Sun Yat-sen line), but after the revolution stressed 
instead the egalitarianism and revolutionary nature of the 
movement. 2 More radical periods in the People's Republic 
praised the egalitarianism of the movement, which was seen as 
a precursor to socialism. That same egalitarianism is now often 
condemned as backward, reflecting peasant utopianism and 
recalling the "leftist excesses" of the Cultural Revolution. The 
Cultural Revolution itself made clear that the major leaders of 
the Taiping (Hong Xiuquan and Yang Xiuqing) were to be 
read as Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, and that certain other 
leaders were in fact capitulationists (as were those scholars who 
wrote more flattering analyses of such leaders). Current trends 
include criticizing the Taiping for failing to use its intellectuals 
well, just as China is putting new emphasis on the importance 
of intellectuals for economic development. 
The political load that the Taiping carries in China is by no 
means unique. Newspapers and editorials treat historical 
subjects much more frequently than in the West, and nearly 
anything can become a metaphor for the present. The most 
striking example in recent Chinese history was the historical 
play Hai Rui Dismissed from Office, which helped catalyze the 
Cultural Revolution. The play depicted a loyal Ming official 
who was unfairly dismissed by a too-powerful emperor. One 
interpretation read the emperor as Mao and Hai Rui as the 
purged Peng Dehuai. Mao insisted that the play be criticized. 
The initial result was an "objective" criticism of the play on the 
grounds of historical inaccuracy. Mao refused to accept this 
2 Luo Ergang, Taiping Tianguo Shigao (Beijing: Kaiming Shuju, 1951), p. 1; Vincent 
Y. C. Shih, The Taiping Ideology: Its Sou-rces, Inte-rp-retations, and Influence (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1967), p. 447. 
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criticism, and criticized the critics for not making the politics of 
historical interpretation be explicit. Understanding historical 
interpretation as political analogy gives historical discourse 
broad social power in China, even as it makes the intellectual's 
own position more precarious. 
Such readings of history are not simple manipulation of the 
past to serve present ends, in spite of occasional accusations to 
the contrary from a Western scholarship that claims to have 
sterilized its politics. They recognize instead that history has 
real implications for contemporary society. Chinese Marxism 
insists that past events are evidence for general principles of 
social life, and historical interpretation can thus make direct 
contributions to current policy. This contrasts with the more 
purely historicist view that all past events were unique and 
could not have happened other than they did, while the 
present, apparently qualitatively different from the past, 
provides us with a wide range of options on which to exercise 
our free will. 
By recognizing the politics of history, the Chinese also 
recognize the social grounding and social influence of the 
scholar. Historians' interpretations, their choice of questions, 
and their selection of data out of the infinite possibilities 
indicate their social and political positions. Just as Chinese 
scholars agree that historical ideas relate to social contexts, they 
recognize that their own ideas also exist against a social 
ground. Yet if ideas reflect the society, they also affect it. 
Indeed, the Chinese government would not have put nearly 
the pressure it has on intellectuals if it did not see a dialectic 
between scholarly ideas and the society-ideas reflect the 
position of the scholar in society even as they alter that society. 
None of this is to claim, of course, that Chinese academics 
and politicians have never manipulated the past for present 
purposes, but the Chinese themselves see such pure manipula-
tion as an abuse. If history indeed provides lessons for the 
present, then it should not be toyed with cynically. Still, the 
party and the central government retain tight political control 
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in China, and the result is regular pressure on academics 
toward certain lines of interpretation, and occasional powerful 
academic reactions against the government when it seems 
relatively safe. 
These attitudes have both new and old roots in the social 
organization of knowledge in China. Scholarship always 
intertwined with politics in late imperial China. Officials were 
by definition scholars, and the goal of scholarship was assumed 
to be public service. The occasional refusal to serve in the 
government by an accomplished scholar who preferred a quiet 
life of art and study was itself a political act. The twentieth 
century and the end of the imperial examination system saw a 
continued political role for intellectuals, now often in 
opposition to the government. Universities provided the 
fomenting grounds for the May Fourth Movement of 1919 (a 
broad reform movement that called for the use of colloquial 
Chinese), for the Chinese Communist Party, for the Cultural 
Revolution, and for the recent wave of protests in China. 
Intellectuals today continue to call on this powerful political 
tradition, which provides both justification and impetus to 
continued action. Marx's grounding of ideas in social 
experience3 further reinforces the Chinese emphasis on the 
political role of the intellectual. In addition, throughout most 
of the current period of reform, the government has wooed 
intellectuals, in many cases offering almost automatic party 
membership to academics. While politics is no longer said to be 
in command, the stress on the important political and social 
role of intellectuals has not decreased. 
Yet as Chinese scholars write explicitly about the relation of 
ideas to society they tend to abandon a more dialectical 
approach for a simple base/superstructure metaphor that 
separates idea and society. Ideas often appear in this discourse 
as mere reflections of class position, or else as hermetically 
3 For example, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, Part I (New 
York: International, 1970). 
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sealed entitles floating independently above the real society. 
On the one hand, for example, the emphasis on forces of 
production as the historical engine of progress, which has 
characterized China's new impetus toward economic develop-
ment, encourages scholars to dismiss ideas completely. On the 
other hand, intellectuals remain, for many people, a kind of 
separate and superior group. Indeed, intellectual snobbery can 
be powerful enough to make foreign visitors wonder whether 
the constant worker and peasant rhetoric of the revolution and 
especially the Cultural Revolution has had any effect at all. 
China stresses individual scholarly achievement and fame as 
much as the West, and jealous guarding of scholarly resources 
typifies much research in China. 
A number of strands thus make up much writing about the 
relation of ideas and society in China-a political tradition that 
recognizes the social power and social grounding of ideas and 
intellectuals, a sort of traditional intellectual position that 
knowledge follows its own course separate from the society,4 
and a reductionist claim that ideas simply reflect class. 
Overlying all this is a base/superstructure metaphor that is little 
analyzed but widely accepted. 
The real social experience of scholars tends to pull a part the 
poles of the most dialectical position about the mutual 
influence of idea and society. Current arguments about 
"communist education" illustrate some of the problems this 
causes as China attempts to adopt some liberal economic 
measures while avoiding "bourgeois liberalization" of thought. 
Communist education-intended as a movement in the 
superstructure only-is supposed to succeed no matter what is 
happening in the economic base. On the one hand, the 
movement teaches Marxism-including as a basic principle the 
determination of the superstructure by the base. On the other 
hand, the very idea that an educational campaign can 
4 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York : International, 
1971 ), pp. 5-23 . 
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completely counteract the social and ideological implications of 
economic transformation rebuts the theory it teaches. 
As I will show for the Taiping, the same kinds of 
complexities show up as inconsistent formulations about the 
class basis of the movement on the one hand, and a 
determined emphasis on great men and great ideas on the 
other. Scholars of the Taiping are political actors in their own 
right, but the social organization of knowledge in China also 
encourages them to see themselves as Chinese Marxist 
populists (who analyze the Taiping as a reflection of peasant 
interests) and at the same time as a kind of traditional 
intellectual elite (who analyze the Taiping through its great 
ideas and acts). Like any discourse, Taiping history contains its 
contradictions and inconsistencies; this paper will explore some 
of their social roots. 
Idea and Society in the Taiping Rebellion 
The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom shook China from about 
1850 to the demise of its capital in 1864. The number of 
casualties is usually said to be well over 10 million; the number 
of articles on the movement written in the People's Republic is 
said to be over five thousand . The movement began with a 
prophet named Hong Xiuquan. Hong was a scholar who 
repeatedly failed the examinations for the lowest official 
degree. During one of his unsuccessful trips to Canton to take 
the exams, he received a copy of an early missionary tract 
called Quanshi Liangyen ("Good Words to Exhort the Age") but 
apparently did not read it. Later, back home in the countryside 
of Guangdong Province, he fell into a delirium and had visions 
of himself being carried to heaven by divine maidens. There 
he met a man in a dragon robe with a great white beard. The 
man explained that he was Hong's true father , that the world 
had once recognized him as its true lord, but that these 
immoral times had replaced him with idols and imps. An elder 
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brother of Hong's had once tried to cleanse the world of its 
sins. Now he gave Hong a sword and a seal of office, and 
instructed him to reform the world. 
This vision puzzled Hong for some years until (after yet 
another examination failure) he carefully rea<!_ th~ missi~nary 
- tract and realized that the old man in the vision was God and 
his elder brother was Jesus. He and several new followers 
baptized themselves following instructions in "Good Words to 
Exhort the Age," and began to proselytize in their home 
county of Huaxian. Before they had gained much of a 
following, however, the elders of the community asked them to 
leave due to their anti-Confucian sentiments. Possibly inspired 
by stories of prophets in the wilderness, they wandered west 
into increasingly peripheral areas. They finally settled in a very 
poor, mountainous area of central Guangxi Province. 
Here the movement really began to grow. With Hong and 
his right-hand man, Feng Yunshan (also from Huaxian) , 
frequently away, local leaders occupied increasin gly important 
positions. Under their influence, the movement grew rapidly 
in size and changed quickly in character. Spirit possession by 
God and Jesus became common, and the movement became 
increasingly militant, attacking a number of local temples. 
Boosted by several thousand armed Hakkas, who had just lost 
one of the endemic local ethnic battles, and having antago-
nized much of the local elite, the uprising itself began in 1850. 
Besieged in the northern Guangxi town of Yung'an, they 
organized the apparatus of state, from imperial titles to official 
printings of their books. After breaking the siege, they began a 
stunning march north and then east down the Yangzi River. 
The government seemed helpless against them as their army 
grew to over a million. Finally, in China's commercial center at 
the lower Yangzi River, they captured Nanjing and declared it 
capital of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. Unable to capture 
Beijing or later Shanghai (where foreigners actively opposed 
them), victim of vicious internal fighting, the Taiping lost their 
capital a decade later and the movement collapsed . 
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The flood of twentieth-century writing about the movement 
stems from more than its huge scale. Taiping writings5 called 
for a major restructuring of the society with land held 
communally and parceled out equally to all (men and women 
getting equal shares, and children getting half-shares). As the 
movement advanced, it also developed a strong anti-Manchu 
(and thus anti-Qing dynasty) sentiment, seeing the Manchus as 
the imps in Hong's early rhetoric. Toward the end, one of the 
movement's leaders also attempted to introduce many Western 
reforms, including suggestions for building telegraph and 
railroad systems. The modernizing reforms and the anti-
Manchu sentiment made the Taiping an appealing reference 
point for the Nationalist revolution of 1911; their egalitarian-
ism and origins in the rural periphery appealed to the 1949 
revolution. 
Religion. My own research in China during 1984-85 on the 
T aiping Heavenly Kingdom concentrated on the role religious 
ideas and rituals played during the early organizing days in 
rural Guangxi. A great deal has been written in the West about 
the nature ofTaiping religion, looking especially for its various 
roots in Christianity and Confucianism. Indeed, with Hong as 
God's younger son and the constant Taiping use of religious 
texts and ritual, the subject cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, 
Chinese scholarship tends to give religion relatively short 
· shrift, and neither Chinese nor Western literature pays much 
heed to how these radical new beliefs really worked at the local 
level. Two major oral-history projects conducted in the middle 
and late 1950s in the original Taiping base areas in Guangxi, 6 
for example, provided very little information on religion, with 
5 Especially the Tianchao Tiamnu Zhidu in Franz Michael , The Taiping Rebellion : 
Histo·ry and Comments, vols. 2-3 (Seattle: U niversity of Washington Press, 197 1). 
6 Guangxi Sheng T aiping Tianguoshi Diaochatuan, Taiping Tianguo Qi_vi Diaocha 
Baogao (Beijing: Sanlian Shudian , 1956) ; Guangxi Zhuangzu Zizhiqu T ongzhiguan, 
ed ., Taiping Tianguo Geming Zai Guangxi Diaocha Ziliao Huibian (Nanning: Guangxi 
Zhuangzu Zizhiqu Renmen Chubanshe, 1962). 
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the exception of some exotic rituals (flags that raised 
themselves on poles, seen as a ruse to suck in the superstitious 
masses or as evidence for contact with the Triads) and some 
discussion of temple destruction (seen as an attack on the 
superstructure of feudalism). Although both studies ha~ long 
sections on economic conditions and class struggle, neither 
dealt separately with any issues of ideology (including 
religion). When I suggested to some of the scholars who had 
been involved in the original research that they must have 
gathered significant information on religion in this area where 
popular ritual remains very strong, they answered that they 
had made no effort at all to record such information because 
the emphasis at the time was on showing the peasant base of 
the movement, and religion was a secondary element that 
distracted from the real issues. Their fairly close concern with 
pre-Taiping social conditions did not lead to any concern with 
pre-Taiping ideological conditions. 
While religious ideas were never research priorities, Chinese 
scholars could not simply ignore them completely-Taiping 
religious rhetoric infused its writings and guided its actions 
(like attempts to ally with Europeans) too much to pass over 
unmentioned. Chinese scholarship addressing the issue usually 
begins by citing Engels on the German Peasant War of 15257 to 
the effect that religion is an outer garment cloaking class 
interest. There is little attempt to prove the assertion for the 
Taiping; many scholars instead assume that such a progressive 
movement must have been motivated solely by class interest:. 
Seeing Taiping religion as a mere outer garmen t, as a simple 
metaphor for politics, resonates with Mao's 1927 indictment of 
religion as one of the feudal ropes (along with landlords, 
lineages, and, for women, men) binding the Chinese people, 
and with the Maoist view that religion in China would 
gradually fade away as the mode of production moved toward 
7 Frederick Engels, The Peasant War in Germany (New York: International, 1973). 
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socialism and communism. 8 Some scholars in the early 1950s 
thus argued that Taiping monotheism helped unite the 
peasants, while others argued that the religion, as a subjectivist 
error, held the movement back in every way. Neither 
argument addresses religion directly as a meaningful system; 
instead, they reduce it to politics. 
As China has relaxed its policy toward religion of all kinds 
during the last few years, Taiping scholars have begun to look 
more seriously at religion. I sat in on a graduate seminar on 
the Taiping in 1985 at Nanjing University, one of the major 
centers of Taiping studies. One day the professor asked the 
class whether they felt that Hong had really believed in his 
religion. Most put forward the standard outer-garment theory, 
holding that Hong had not believed. Several seemed stunned 
that any other view would even be considered; the outer-
garment theory is so thoroughly part of the literature that 
most students simply take it for granted and do not see it as an 
issue. This typical picture of religion as the sheep's clothing 
draped over a political wolf implies a mixed view about the 
relations of ideas to society. For some it says that real people 
are not taken in by mere ideas; peasants are natural 
materialists. (Why they bothered with the religious rhetoric at 
all is less clear.) For others, however, the theory implies a very 
low view of the masses as superstitious sheep taken in by 
clever great men of the movement. The religious ideas are 
either transparent, "mere" metaphor, or they are powerful 
determiners of social action. Either way, the dialectic of idea 
and society has been pulled apart. 
The professor of the Taiping seminar, who was himself an 
important Taiping scholar, was much more open than many of 
his students to the possibility of Hong's real belief in his 
religion, and the matter has seen increasing investigation from 
a number of leading Taiping scholars. Duan Benluo, for 
8 Mao Zedong, "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," in 
Selected Works of Mao Zedong (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967) , pp. 23-59. 
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example, has argued more dialectically that Taiping religion 
both had roots in local economic conditions (making it 
fundamentally different from Christianity) and had an 
important function in organizing and centralizing Taiping 
power.9 Typically, his articles can also be read in relation to a 
current political campaign, in this case Duan's criticism of 
Taiping overcentralization recalled the effort to decentralize 
many economic functions in the 1980s. 
The new interest in religion has led to examination of some 
topics that had been almost entirely ignored, even in the 
voluminous literature on the Taiping. One of thes.e is spirit 
possession, an area that forces concentration on the interaction 
between Hong's original beliefs (which did not include 
possession) and local religious traditions. 10 Nevertheless, the 
outer-garment theory of religion is far from dead even in this 
newer literature, as seen for example in the title of Xing 
Fenglin's 1981 article, "On Certain Questions Concerning 
Yang Xiuqing Pretending to Be Possessed by the Heavenly 
Father."11 Local traditions of spirit possession were very strong 
in the early Taiping base area, and the original leaders found 
themselves forced to allow it, and even to recognize the 
authority of two locals (Yang Xiuqing and Xiao Chaogui) to 
speak as God and Jesus, respectively. Using this power to 
attack their enemies, to prevent their rivals from using the 
same possession techniques against them, and to aggrandize 
their own positions, both individuals became T aiping kings. 
Xiao died in an early battle, but Yang developed into the most 
9 Duan Benluo, "'Bai Shangdi Jiao' yu T aiping Tianguo de Xingwang," jiangsu 
Shiyuan Xuebao, no. 4 (1980): 34- 45 ; "Lun Bai Shangdi Jiao de Chuangli," in Nanjing 
Daxu e Lishixi T aiping Tianguoshi Yanjiushi, ed., Taiping Tianguoshi Xintan (Suzhou: 
Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 1982), pp. 135-1 46. 
10 Xing Fenglin, "Yang Xiuqing yu 'jiangtong'," Guangxi Ribao, August 17, 1980; 
"Guanyu Yang Xiuqing Jiatuo T ian fu Fushen Chuanyan de Ruogan Wenti," in 
Guangxi Taiping Tianguoshi Yanj iuhui , ed ., Taiping Tianguoshi Yanjiu Wenxuan 
(Nanning: Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 198 1); Wang Qingcheng, " 'Tianfu Sheng-
zhi,' 'Tianx iong Shengzhi' he T aiping T ianguo Lishi ,' ' Jindai.shi Yanjiu, no. 2 (1985) : 
19 1-239. 
11 Xing, "Guan yu Yang Xiuqing." 
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powerful person apart from Hong himself. While he was 
possessed by God, no one-certainly not his filial son Hong 
Xiuquan- had power over him. As the movement grew, 
Yang's use of this power became increasingly obviously 
self-serving. Having berated Hong a number of times, God 
finally requested that Yang be addressed with imperial titles 
that had been reserved for Hong. His murder at the hands of 
other Taiping kings followed soon afterward. Possession is 
thus an area where it is possible to trace some of the 
organizational consequences of religious ideas for the move-
ment as a whole, but the research will require a social theory of 
ideas that neither makes ideas transparent metaphors nor sees 
them as easy tools for manipulation of the masses. 
Another religious topic has seen more discussion in China, 
but brings up many of the same issues. This is the question of 
whether Hong's motives were always entirely political and 
revolutionary. Luo Ergang had established what became the 
standard view after the Communist revolution-that Hong's 
ambition to rebel had been born with his original vision and 
that he never wavered from this political course. During the 
early 1960s (one of China's less radical periods), however, 
several authors suggested that Hong's motives may have been 
religious in the early years, turning rebellious only in the late 
1840s. Historically, the argument centered on the dating of a 
few poems; theoretically, it centered on whether religious ideas 
could ever motivate a progressive movement. The new 
arguments were discredited during the Cultural Revolution, 
which adopted the outer-garment theory with a vengeance. 
Hong's God became a purely political metaphor, and Hong 
himself was really an atheist and materialist. Indeed, they 
argued that no workers' movement (as the Taiping was 
classified) could contain major idealist elements. The argu-
ments of the early 1960s have returned during the reforms of 
the late 1970s, with a new emphasis on the transformation of 
Hong's Christianity after the establishment of the base in 
Guangxi. A number of senior Taiping scholars are now willing 
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to argue that Hong's early motivations were religious, and that 
his destruction of Confucian tablets was more a personal act of 
frustration in the imperial examinations than an act of 
revolution. Some have even suggested that Hong became 
rebellious only as a result of quite local developments of the 
movement in Guangxi.I2 
Most work on religion has been caught in a mechanical 
reading of Marx's base/superstructure metaphor. During the 
most radical periods, increased rhetoric praising the historical 
role of workers and peasants, and extolling their naturally 
progressive (read materialist) thinking, has led to a virtual 
dismissal of the role of religion in the Taiping rebellion. More 
conservative periods, which have generally accompanied a 
more relaxed policy toward religion, have encouraged scholars 
to bring religion back into their interpretations. This change is 
part of a less strictly utopian Marxism, along with the more 
obvious daily experiences of scholars who see a lively popular 
religion going on around them that becomes invisible in more 
radical periods. Yet for all this new examination of religion, 
and in spite of the more dialectical view of ideas and society 
implied in the day-to-day treatment of the political implica-
tions of scholars and their works, the mechanical base/super-
structure model still cannot be challenged explicitly, and the 
new research does not receive an adequate theoretical 
formulation. 
E. P. Thompson spoke at Nanjing University while I was 
there, and his presence aroused considerable interest from the 
Chinese, excited about the chance to hear an official 
"revisionist" who had not previously been welcome in China. 
12 See, for example, Li Feiran, "Hong Xiuquan Zaoqi Sixiang Pouxi," in Guangxi 
Taiping Tianguoshi Yanjiuhui, ed., Taiping Tianguoshi Yanjiu We·nxuan (Nanning: 
Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 1979), pp. 120-146; Mao Jiaqi , Fang Zhiguang, and 
Tong Guanghua, Taiping Tianguo Xingwangshi (Shanghai : Shanghai Renmin Chuban-
she, 1980), pp. 11-23 ; Wang Qingcheng, "Lun Hong Xiuquan de Zaoqi Sixiang ji Qi 
Fazhan," in Zhonghua Shuju Jindaishi Bianjishi, ed., Taiping Tianguoshi Xueshu 
Taolunhui Lunwen Xuanji (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1981), pp. 243-280. 
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The major point of his public lecture was that the base/super-
structure metaphor was neither very important in Marx nor 
very useful. The result was a fairly cold reception and limited 
discussion that did not address the major points. Several more 
senior historians seemed to ~nd his points simply wrong and 
possibly rude, and a number of the graduate students would 
have been much more interested in a less Marxist speaker. 
Great Men. I had originally expected to find a great deal of 
work on the political economy of the Taiping areas of 
Guangxi. Although some interesting work has been done, 
many studies are content with broad generalizations about 
centralization of land tenure, usurious interest, and other 
factors across China as a whole. Surprisingly little is known 
about specific political economic conditions in Guangxi. Even 
extended arguments about whether peasants, protoproletar-
ians (silver miners and charcoal burners had important roles), 
or some combination of the two led the Taiping movement 
have not encouraged detailed studies of local labor processes 
and relations of production. 
I asked in Guangxi, for example, whether any systematic 
effort had been made to find surviving land records. While no 
such effort had apparently been made, local scholars had 
instead looked for and found some records relating to the top 
leaders of the movement. Indeed, for scholars committed 
entirely to social history, the size and detail of the literature on 
great men is surprising. Biography, for example, is a very 
popular genre, 13 and it always stars the great leaders of the 
Taiping. The kind of biography of little known followers that 
is becoming popular in the West remains unpopular in China. 
Nearly all Chinese works on the Taiping claim to place the 
13 Some recent examples include Peng Dayong, Li Feiran, Zhu Zhefang, and Deng 
Jiezhang, Hong Xiuquan Zhuan (Beijing: Zhongguo Qingnian Chubanshe, 1982); Su 
Shuangbi, Taiping Tianguo Renwu Lunji (Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin Chubanshe, 1984) ; 
Zhong Wendian, Taiping Tianguo Renwu (Nanning: Guangxi Renmin Chubanshe, 
1984). 
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movement on an economic base, but many concentrate on 
Hong Xiuquan and the other top leaders in practice. Much of 
their oral history-probably the best chance of learning about 
the lives of the .followers instead of the leaders-also seeks to 
trace the actions of the great ones, and to clarify the military 
history of the movement. They teach us disappointingly little 
about the everyday lives of most of the Taiping camp. 
One good example of this is the Taiping literature written 
during the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution 
insisted fervently on the leadership of the movement by the 
peasant masses. Yet arguments about the motivations of a 
single secondary leader absolutely dominated the scholarly 
literature of the time. The person involved was Li Xiucheng, a 
minor leader during the early days of the movement who 
developed into one of its most important generals. He is 
famous especially because of a lengthy confession he made 
after his capture during the final battles of the rebellion. The 
confession provides much information on the development of 
the rebellion, but was controversial because of Li's extremely 
accommodating attitude toward his captors. T he early 1960s 
brought a few suggestions, including a People's Daily editorial, 
that Li had been a capitulationist, although others argued that 
Li's captor had edited the confession to suit his own purposes. 
The real campaign on this issue began in 1964, and by the time 
the Cultural Revolution was in full swing (1966 on), attacks on 
Li's moral character riddled the Taiping literature. At the 
beginning of the campaign in 1964-65, one provincial 
newspaper (Guangxi Ribao) alone ran over forty articles and 
editorials on Li Xiucheng. 14 Some of these articles described 
such events as discussions of the opinions of a certain scholar 
on Li Xiucheng by elementary school students and by People's 
Liberation Army units. I have already mentioned how this 
14 See Guangxi Zhuangzu Zizhiqu Di 'er T ushuguan, ed. , "Guangxi Youguan Yanjiu 
Taiping Tianguoshi de Wenzhang he Zhuzuo Mulu," in Guangxi T aiping Tianguoshi 
Yanjiuhui, ed. , Taiping Tianguoshi Yanjiu Wenxuan (Nanning: Guangxi Renmin 
Chubanshe, 198 1), pp. 339- 359, fo r citations. 
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campaign fit with Cultural Revolution policies as a critique of 
those who wished to surrender the revolution instead of 
carrying through Mao's radical policies. Here I want to stress 
how the Cultural Revolution remained caught on the horns of 
the usual dilemma-an insistence on both the material and 
social base of the movement alongside concentration on only 
the great men. 
When the Cultural Revolution dealt with other aspects of the 
Taiping, it usually involved drawing parallels between Hong's 
anti-Confucianism and the "Criticize Confucius and Lin Biao" 
campaign of the early 1970s. Much of the implicit (and 
frequently explicit in later years) Taiping adoption of 
Confucian ideas went unsaid during this period. Once again, 
the individual philosophies of two great men (Hong and 
Confucius in this case) came to dominate a discourse dedicated 
to broad social and economic analysis. In fact , the Cultural 
Revolution drew to extremes the internal contradictions 
between great men and social analysis that typify the entire 
postrevolutionary period. The Mao cult existed alongside an 
insistence on the natural correctness of the proletariat as a 
class, just as Taiping historiography put tremendous emphasis 
on Hong's personal philosophy (at least the anti-Confucian 
and egalitarian aspects of it) as the primary aspect of the 
rebellion, alongside an analysis that treated the rebellion as an 
outpouring of the peasants as a class. The Cultural Revolution 
drew to extremes the problems inherent in the discourse that 
preceded and followed it. 
The Role of the West. Evaluation of the role of the Western 
powers in the Taiping rebellion provides a final example of 
this contradiction in the historiographical discourse. The 
Taiping originally adopted a pro-Western stance. In fact , they 
appeared to expect the British, as their Christian brothers, to 
ally with them. The British, however, apparently had a 
different idea of brotherhood . The foreign community actively 
resisted a Taiping approach to the city of Shanghai. The 
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Taiping army, which had expected to be met with fraternal 
embraces, stood dumbfounded, and then retreated without 
returning fire. Later in the rebellion, the British took an active 
role in defense of the Qing Dynasty against the Taiping. The 
British were not thrilled with Hong's claim to be God's son, but 
worried primarily that the Taiping (who banned opmm 
smoking) might interfere with trade. 
Most Chinese evaluations of the foreign role thus take a 
negative view. They emphasize the nationalist character of the 
movement, downplaying Taiping attempts to ally with their 
"overseas brothers." At the same time, they rightly point out 
the reactionary role of the British, who supported the Qing 
against the Taiping while also fighting the Qing in the Second 
Opium War. Some authors also mark this period as China's 
entry into the position of a "semifeudal semicolonial" state, 
meaning that a successful revolution would have to oppose 
both traditional social relations and foreign domination. 
Yet a parallel literature also exists, extolling the contribu-
tions of certain foreigners to the success of the rebellion. The 
most press is usually reserved for Augustus Lindley, a British 
adventurer who fought alongside the rebels for many years, 
and who published his memoirs as a long apologia for the 
movement and criticism of the role of the British govern-
ment.15 Tang and Dai, for example, commemorate the 
sacrifices of Lindley and other foreigners. 16 Implicit in this and 
other articles is a comparison to the role of the West in the 
revolution of 1949, where the Western powers played 
generally reactionary parts but certain individuals were 
enormously helpful and were honored in China throughout 
the decades that followed. 
15 Augustus F. Lindley, Ti-ping Tien-Kwoh: The History of the Taiping Revolution, 
Including a Narrative of the Author's Personal Adventures, 2 vols. (London: Day & Son, 
1866). 
16 Tang Mingzhu and Dai Baozong, "Linli yu Taiping Tianguo," in Nanjing Daxue 
Lishixi Taiping Tianguoshi Yanjiushi , ed., Taiping Tianguoshi Xintan (Suzhou: Jiangsu 
Renmin Chubanshe, 1982), pp. 100-109. 
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Once again, this literature shows a general distinction 
between the broad social analysis of whole groups (foreigners 
in this case) and the powerful role of certain special 
individuals. Does the material base determine all, or do 
guiding individuals and guiding ideas move history? Chinese 
theory emphasizes only the first possibility, but Chinese 
practice recognizes both. 
Shaping the Discourse 
I have so far argued two main points: first, that scholarship 
in China explicitly recognizes its political roots and effects 
much more than Western scholarship, and thus implicitly 
recognizes a kind of dialectic between historians' ideas and 
their social positions; second, that where Chinese historians 
explicitly address the relation between idea and society, they 
tend to lose sight of the dialectic, splitting between interpreta-
tions that see ideas as transparent metaphors for class interests 
and those that see great men and great ideas as determiners 
of historical development. Such an inconsistent treatment is 
rooted as much in the social experience of Chinese scholars as 
in the version of Marxism with which they work. 
Citizens and Bureaucrats. Intellectuals are now officially a kind 
of worker in China. Seeing themselves as ordinary citizens, in a 
country where ordinary citizens are even now very politicized, 
intellectuals have to recognize in part their own social 
grounding and social influence. China's system of small group 
meetings, which discuss current events and current politics, 17 
reinforces the grounding of the intellectual as citizen. Small 
groups are expected to address how current political cam-
paigns affect their members. Each individual should take an 
active part in these discussions. During any of the frequent 
17 Martin King Whyte, Small Groups and Political Rituals in China (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1974). 
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political campaigns, participants evaluate their own perfor-
mances in relation to the new political goals, criticize their 
errors if necessary (ziwo piping), and think through how the 
new campaign should influence their future work. For 
academics, such discussion may include analysis of their past 
writings that makes explicit their current political implications. 
This system thus holds historians responsible not just for the 
factual accuracy and innovative interpretation in their works, 
but also for the social grounding they reveal and the political 
conclusions they imply. 
Much of the daily experience of scholars in China thus 
reinforces their view that ideas, including their own ideas, 
reflect social life. The Chinese Marxist theory on which most 
of these scholars have been raised, the close links between 
scholarship and power that have characterized China from 
imperial times on, and the regular experience with political 
campaigns and small group meetings combine to root their 
historical works in class position and political stance. One 
consequence of this is an intelligentsia that feels its relation to 
the rest of society more strongly than scholars in many other 
systems, and which thus sometimes willingly takes great risks 
for politics. This has occurred in this century from the May 
Fourth Movement to the dissident journals of today, and crops 
up periodically in events like the petition (signed with many 
real names) that many Chinese studying in the United States 
sent to China in support of the student demonstrations of 
December 1986. The action the government takes against 
especially active intellectual critics, and in favor of those whose 
ideas strike politically consonant chords, further supports this 
politicization of academics. 
While so much daily, historical, and theoretical experience 
of Chinese scholars supports the view that ideas reflect social 
life, still other experiences support instead the other view that 
often crops up in their analyses of the Taiping-that great 
men and their ideas are guiding influences. Intellectuals are 
highly respected, and while I was there party membership was 
HISTORIANS AND CONSCIOUSNESS 751 
nearly automatic for those intellectuals who wanted it. The 
academic system itself places very high value on big names, 
who attract top graduate students, who in turn are asked to 
remain in the university as junior faculty. Departments can 
thus easily develop powerful, inbred factions built around 
senior scholars. These scholars control crucial resources, 
• including library collections, access to university libraries, and 
connections to other universities. 
Information is tightly controlled, with access to university 
library collections strongly hierarchized by rank. Undergradu-
ates have only very limited access to libraries, graduate 
students have more, and so on up through the top professors. 
Control is parochial as much as hierarchical. Even senior 
scholars may not get access to libraries and collections outside 
of their home university. People who control collections often 
guard them jealously as resources for personal advancement in 
the scholarly hierarchy. Some of these problems may not seem 
totally foreign to Western scholars, but they can be acute in 
China. This aspect of the social organization of knowledge in 
China acts against the idea that scholars are all equally citizens, 
working together as parts of the society. Instead it teaches 
scholars that they are indeed privileged, that success in the 
realm of ideas translates into very real power, and that their 
claim to control innovative ideas places them to an extent over 
the rest of the society. From such a standpoint, historical 
concentration on great men and their ideas is sensible. 
Chinese Marxism . Virtually all scholars in China accept and 
share a form of Marxism that they have learned throughout 
their educations. Just as most departments include faculty to 
teach foreign languages, most also have their own faculty to 
teach required courses in Marxism. Among the shared 
assumptions in explicit theoretical discussions are the priority 
of material over ideational factors and the determination of 
the superstructure by the base. Many articles begin with 
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standard citations from Marx, Engels, Lenin, or Mao to this 
effect. These assumptions are rarely questioned explicitly. 
Yet Chinese Marxism, more than most other versions in 
socialist countries, also has a streak that strongly emphasizes 
human agency. When a young Mao Zedong in 1926 analyzed 
rural class structure in China, 18 he drew his class lines not just 
by control over the means of production but also by asking l 
whose side various classes would take in the coming struggle. 
This more voluntarist aspect of his thought grew into the 
Cultural Revolution idea that class membership lay as much in 
how people thought as in how they worked. Thus, even in 
socialist China where labor power was no longer bought and 
sold, people could still be labeled as capitalist roaders. The Red 
Guard effort to wipe out parts of China's historical legacy 
again speaks to the power they granted to "subjective," cultural 
factors, even if they did not really build such a power into their 
base/superstructure model. The Mao cult itself, which bur-
geoned during the Cultural Revolution to the point where 
waving the little red book was supposed to surmount all kinds 
of difficulties, implied a kind of great men and great ideas view 
of the world that rested only uneasily with a strong emphasis 
on determination by a material base. As I have shown, the 
Taiping historians offer the same awkward combination of a 
reduction of ideas to mere metaphor, along with an 
augmentation of ideas (and their originators) to great heights. 
Strict training in the Marxist classics along with grave political 
consequences for questioning theoretical dogma, however, 
have prevented an explicit and thorough theoretical consider-
ation of this awkward combination. 
I do not mean to imply that Chinese Marxism is simply a ,. 
mental straitjacket. Like any discourse in the West, it provides 
people with a set of assumptions, within which they argue and 
most of which remain invisible to people within the discourse. 
18 Mao Zedong, "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society," in Selected Readings from 
the Works of Mao Zedong (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press , 1971), pp. 11-22. 
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Indeed, some of the arguments that stem directly from 
Chinese Marxism and its ties to current politics have been very 
fruitful in studies of the Taiping rebellion. Chinese scholars of 
the Taiping, for instance, have produced a large literature on 
the class base of the revolution-was it purely peasants (and if 
so was it by definition reactionary and feudal?), peasants with 
some capitalist influence, protoproletarians, proletarians, or 
some conjunction of these already compounded classes? 19 This 
may seem like counting Marxist angels on the head of a pin, 
but the argument faces important issues even within the 
base/superstructure metaphor that all versions assume. At 
heart, the argument is over how participants in the rebellion fit 
into the larger society-as feudal underlings, as self-sufficient 
farmers who produced some commodities on the side, as 
workers with only their labor to sell, and so forth. The implied 
issues are similar to many questions that Western scholarship 
regularly addresses: how and when do capital and labor 
separate, and how does the separation affect the people 
directly involved? 
Even the question of the value judgment (pingjia) to be 
placed on Taiping egalitarianism-branding it as backward 
and hopelessly feudal, or praising it as progressive and 
modern-implies important issues, even if placing value 
judgments on history seems very odd to "objective" history in 
the West. First, of course, it emphasizes again the political 
value of history in China, where the idea of learning from the 
past is taken very seriously. Second, it questions the relation of 
consciousness to mode of production, asking whether peasant 
egalitarianism is simply a reflection of the peasant's position in 
19 For a set of articles edited together, which exemplify some of the arguments 
involved, see Guo Yisheng, "Shi Minzhuxing de Jinghua, haishi Fengjiansing de 
Caobo? Guanyu 'Tianchao Tianmu Zhidu' de Pingjia Wenti," in Nanjing Daxue 
Lishixi Taiping Tianguoshi Yanjiushi, ed. , Taiping Tianguoshi Xintan (Suzhou: Jiangsu 
Renmin Chubanshe, 1982), pp. 7-22; Han Ming, "'Tianchao Tianmu Zhidu' zhong 
Pingfen Tudi Sixiang Yuanliu Chutan," ibid., pp. 23-35; Su Shuangbi, "Shilun Taiping 
Tianguo Geming de Xingzhi," ibid., pp. 60-80. 
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feudalism (and should thus be judged harshly) or whether 
peasants can begin to develop oppositional alternatives even 
from within the feudal system (and should thus be praised). 
The base/superstructure metaphor has pushed scholars of 
the Taiping in certain directions, and it has helped create an 
inconsistent theoretical treatment of the relation between ideas 
and society, but it has by no means squelched insightful debate. 
The Chinese discourse may seem biased (or just odd) to 
non-Marxists in the \Nest-it is overtly political and seems 
caught in a stilted and limiting jargon. To Western Marxists, 
the discourse may be simply disappointing-it offers very little 
insight into the search for alternative views of the relation 
between consciousness and society that is so common now in 
the West. In many ways, however, the Chinese discourse is 
much like any Western discourse; it is very difficult to rework 
the system from within its own guiding principles, it tends to 
generate its own, internally invisible inconsistencies, and yet it 
also produces a range of very fruitful argument. 
Perhaps the greatest difference between this Chinese 
discourse and academics in the West is the much more explicit 
recognition of politics in China. Both government and scholars 
are very sensitive to the political implications of scholarship, 
and government reactions to departures from acceptable 
practice are more powerful than the more implicit, decentral-
ized, and informal mechanisms of control in Western academe. 
While this has led to a strong continuation of China's tradition 
of intellectual activists, it also creates some problems. Dissent 
within the system is so difficult at times that people feel forced 
to abandon the system because reform seems impossible. Many 
younger scholars in China are not at all interested in Marxist 
theory-neither China's nor the very different Marxisms of 
the West. After years of required Marxism courses and endless 
quotes from the classics, they see Marxism only as a straitjacket 
and are far more interested in mainstream Western scholar-
ship than in alternative Marxisms. 
Western scholars often feel, and often are, caught in an 
• 
• 
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ivory tower, cut off from larger political processes. Chinese 
scholars undoubtedly share many of the same feelings-
unique intellectual accomplishment is highly valued in both 
places-but they also have a side that recognizes the political 
background and political influence of everything they write 
and teach. This affects the willingness that many Chinese 
scholars have had to take bold political stands. Yet this double 
aspect of their lives also shows up in their analysis as a lack of 
clarity about the relation of ideas to society at other times. Just 
as they view themselves partly as special, powerful, intelligent 
beings and partly as representatives of a certain class and 
political position, the people they analyze tend to appear partly 
as great minds and great movers, and partly as agents whose 
ideas simply reflect broader class interests . 
